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I.

INTRODUCTION

The future is bringing drastic changes to our elections.
Whether hidden interference from foreign states, sudden disruption from
a global pandemic, or excessive influence from campaigns whose war chests
grow ever larger, elections are no longer the same.1 In this increasingly
* J.D. Candidate 2021, University of Dayton School of Law. The author would like to thank
Professor Chris Roederer for his expertise in exploring the nuances of First Amendment law. The author
would also like to thank his family—without their support, love, and dedication, none of this would have
been possible.
1
See generally ROBERT S. MUELLER, III, REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION INTO RUSSIAN
INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION (2019); Two-Thirds of Americans Expect
Presidential Election Will Be Disrupted by COVID-19, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (April 28, 2020),
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polarized political environment, the stakes grow ever higher. The myriad
of voices and the numerous ways they are communicated are arguably
beginning to overcome voter protections granted by existing law.
Modern technology is beginning to cause problems for the American
electorate, namely, undue influence on voters or outright voter suppression. 2
As these new problems arise, new laws need to be enacted to address
them. Such laws can be tricky to craft because the solution to these problems
lies at the intersection of two fundamental pillars of our country: the right
to free speech and the right to vote. 3 On one hand is a robust body of law
surrounding the First Amendment, and on the other is the very substance
of the American democratic model. 4 To detract from one is to damage the
other; restricting free speech may lead to diminished engagement in the
democratic process, whereas failing to protect the right to vote may lead to a
decreased ability to express one’s opinions. 5 A balance must be struck
between the two, one that steadfastly guards our First Amendment rights
while also ensuring that we can freely exercise our right to vote in
a meaningful way to our country. 6
In 1992, Burson v. Freeman represented a new development in
defending voters’ rights. 7 The Supreme Court recognized that voter
protections could sometimes supersede First Amendment concerns if
circumstances are compelling enough to warrant them, which was
an expansion of doctrine from the earlier Mills v. Alabama decision that had
effectively rejected any attempt to regulate election speech.8 The Supreme
Court in Burson allowed states to regulate speech “in and around the polls,”
an area left open to regulation by Mills. 9 It approved of a state statute to
restrict campaign speech within 100 feet of the polling place, which served
to protect voters from intimidation efforts by overzealous advocates. 10
These decisions might have been appropriate for an earlier time in 1966, or
just at the start of the internet in 1992 when the vast majority of voting was
https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2020/04/28/two-thirds-of-americans-expect-presidential-electionwill-be-disrupted-by-covid-19; Zachary Albert, Trends in Campaign Financing, 1980-2016, REPORT FOR
THE CAMPAIGN FINANCE TASK FORCE (Oct. 12, 2017), https://bipartisanpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/
2019/05/Trends-in-Campaign-Financing-1980-2016.-Zachary-Albert..pdf.
2
See generally Hunt Allcott & Matthew Gentzkow, Social Media and Fake News in the 2016
Election, 31 J. ECON. PERSP. 211 (2017); Kevin Roose, Misinformation Peddlers Start Early on Election
Day, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/03/technology/misinformationpeddlers-start-early-on-election-day.html.
3
Barry P. McDonald, The First Amendment and the Free Flow of Information: Towards A Realistic
Right to Gather Information in the Information Age, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 249, 254 (2004).
4
Id.
5
Richard A. Schurr, Burson v. Freeman: Where the Right to Vote Intersects with the Freedom to
Speak, 15 WHITTIER L. REV. 869, 895 (1994).
6
Id.
7
See generally Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992).
8
Id. at 193; 384 U.S. 214, 220 (1966).
9
Burson, 504 U.S. at 193 (citing Mills, 384 U.S. at 218).
10
Id. at 209–210.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol47/iss1/7

2022]

Election Silence

137

still done at the ballot box on Election Day. 11 However, in today’s
increasingly digital age, Burson may no longer be sufficient, and
Mills v. Alabama needs to be revisited.
Indeed, the voting processes across the country have changed,
increasing voter access, expanding mail-in ballots, and even introducing
online voting in some very limited circumstances. 12 With these new
developments come new dangers. One concern is that there could be undue
influence and intimidation on the voter while they are voting, as interested
third parties would have greater access to the voter via mail or online as
opposed to being restricted 100 feet away from the ballot box. 13 Another area
could be actual voter fraud, and although election fraud has historically been
low, one can imagine that would-be wrongdoers could seize on the increased
volume of non-traditional voting methods to tamper with our elections. 14
These concerns may feel overblown and dramatic, but it bears
remembering that threats to the democratic process are very real, such as
the Watergate scandal in 1972, the countless attempts that the United States
has made at interfering in other countries’ elections, or the time it actually
happened to us in 2016. 15 There are reports that attempts to interfere with
American elections still continued in the 2020 presidential election. 16
11
Olivia B. Waxman, Voting by Mail Dates Back to America’s Earliest Years. Here’s How It’s
Changed Over the Years, TIME, https://time.com/5892357/voting-by-mail-history/ (Sept. 28, 2020,
8:17 PM).
12
Eric Geller, Coronavirus boosts push for online voting despite security risks, POLITICO (May 1,
2020, 7:30 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/05/01/coronavirus-online-voting-229690. While
cybersecurity is a large component of evaluating the feasibility of online voting, this Comment does not
delve into that area. It instead focuses on the practical aspects on the human side of the process, as far as
election silence is concerned.
13
Anyone with a mailbox or a P.O. Box knows how inundated it can be with campaign mail in the
final weeks and days of the election season. Some scholars have concluded that direct mail has a
measurable impact on turnout and intent to vote. See David Doherty & E. Scott Adler, The Persuasive
Effects of Partisan Campaign Mailers, 67 POL. RSCH. Q., 562, 569 (2014), https://www.jstor.org/stable/
24371892. However, others have cast doubt on their effectiveness in certain circumstances. See generally
Joshua L. Kalla & David E. Broockman, The Minimal Persuasive Effects of Campaign Contact in General
Elections: Evidence from 49 Field Experiments, 112 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 148 (2018). This Comment
proceeds with the assumption that there is some impact at some level warranting concerns.
14
See Amber McReynolds & Charles Stewart III, Let’s put the vote-by-mail ‘fraud’ myth to rest, HILL
(Apr. 28, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://thehill.com/opinion/campaign/494189-lets-put-the-vote-by-mail-fraudmyth-to-rest; see also Debunking the Voter Fraud Myth, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE AT N.Y.U.
SCHOOL OF LAW (Jan. 31, 2017), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/analysis/Briefing_
Memo_Debunking_Voter_Fraud_Myth.pdf. The pandemic has led to a vast increase in ballots cast by
mail in the 2020 general election, and while there was virtually no apparent fraud, there continued to be
doubt cast on the legitimacy of mail-in ballots.
See Election Results, 2020: Analysis of
rejected ballots, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Election_results,_2020:_Analysis_of_rejected
_ballots (Sept. 10, 2021); see also Alan Feuer & Zach Montague, Over 30 Trump Campaign Lawsuits
Have Failed. Some Rulings are Scathing, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/25/us/elections/
trump-campaign-lawsuits.htm (Dec. 10, 2020).
15
See generally CARL BERNSTEIN & BOB WOODWARD, ALL THE PRESIDENT’S MEN (2d ed. 2012);
MUELLER, supra note 1; see also Scott Shane, Russia Isn’t the Only One Meddling in Elections. We Do
It, Too, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/17/sunday-review/russia-isnt-theonly-one-meddling-in-elections-we-do-it-too.html.
16
Zachary Cohen et al., FBI director Wray says Russia is actively interfering in 2020 election to
‘denigrate’ Biden, CNN Politics, https://www.cnn.com/2020/09/17/politics/fbi-director-wray-russia-
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To be sure, ensuring confidence in election security and polling results will
become increasingly important, and the recommendations outlined in this
Comment are an important step in preparing for the future.
Due to the inevitable shift in voting procedures brought about by
modernizing election protocols, the United States needs to continue
expanding voter protections during a short period at the end of an election
season. While existing legal doctrines on speech in elections were sufficient
for the time in which they were created, we must look forward to the future
and adopt stronger regulations for our changing times. This means revisiting
the decision in Mills v. Alabama, within the modern context, while drawing
supporting rationale from Burson v. Freeman to provide the necessary
justifications as required by constitutional law.
This Comment recommends that “election silence” policies be
implemented to limit campaign speech and media reporting for the duration
of Election Day in an effort to protect voters and election integrity. Part II
provides the background for this recommendation by examining the necessity
and rationales espoused by the Supreme Court of the United States in
Mills v. Alabama and Burson v. Freeman, as well as other lower court
decisions. This part briefly looks at other states’ laws concerning election
silence in light of these judicial rulings. It also details some theoretical
consequences and implications of exit polling, increased mail-in balloting,
and online voting. Part III will advocate for expanding the rationale of Burson
to permit a broader scope of election silence and voter protection. It will also
be cognizant of potential objections and challenges to the proposal, charting
a middle-road approach between the insufficient status quo and a blatantly
unconstitutional extreme approach. Part IV concludes with thoughts on how
such policies could be approached and their ameliorative effect on
the American electorate.
II.

BACKGROUND

This section begins with a discussion of the Supreme Court’s
early foray into free speech restrictions with respect to elections in
Mills v. Alabama. 17 Next, it moves on to the seminal case of Burson v.
Freeman, in which the Court upheld Tennessee’s 100-foot radius of political
speech exclusion as a form of voter protection. 18 Then this section will
discuss modern laws on polling place buffer zones as applied in several states,
as well as how some others have been challenged in courts. Finally, this

election-interference/index.html (Sept. 17, 2020, 5:36 PM); Press Release, Off. of the Dir. of Nat’l Intel.,
Statement by NCSC Director William Evanina: Election Threat Update for the American Public
(Aug. 7, 2020) (on file with author).
17
See generally Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966).
18
Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992).
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section will look to the future by covering the potential evolution of election
procedures and some of the problems online voting may cause.
A. Supreme Court Decisions
Voting in the early history of the United States was not as clean and
organized an affair as it is today, even considering the numerous problems we
currently face. It was then largely a matter of how many voters a party
apparatus could control or how many voters from the opposing side they could
intimidate and deter from going to the polls. 19 Citizens were hard-pressed to
escape public scrutiny of their decisions at the ballot box due to intense
pressure from party bosses or their employers. 20 It was not an uncommon
practice for voters to be ferried en masse to the polls by party operatives as
a show of force to ensure a positive result. 21 Changes were necessary to
prevent continued intimidation and interference with the integrity of
the voting process. 22
Enter the Australian ballot, a standardized secret ballot with which
voters’ choices could be protected from solicitors and onlookers. 23 This ballot
was meant to be the solution to direct voter intimidation by allowing voters
to make their choices from a predetermined set of candidates on a consistent
format that they could trust. 24 However, it was not enough to implement
a new balloting system. There existed a need to establish and preserve the
secrecy of that ballot from bystanders, and to achieve this, excluding
“the general public from the entire polling room” was necessary. 25 Since
people were finally able to exercise their right to vote in a room free from
interference, some found that the adoption of the Australian ballot was
sufficient to protect voters’ interests.26 However, there still remained issues
regarding excessive solicitation and intimidation in the spaces leading up to
and surrounding the polling place and ballot box; voters were still susceptible
to others’ attempts to influence them as they approached the polls. 27
To address this continuing issue, the state of Alabama enacted
a statute which made it “a crime ‘to do any electioneering or to solicit any
votes’” on Election Day. 28 This was meant to protect “the public from
confusive [sic] last-minute charges and countercharges and the distribution

19
ELDON COBB EVANS, A HISTORY OF THE AUSTRALIAN BALLOT SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES
12 (1917).
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id. at 21.
23
Id. at 17, 21.
24
Id. at 23–25.
25
Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 203 (1992).
26
Schurr, supra note 5, at 890; Burson, 504 U.S. at 203–04.
27
Schurr, supra note 5, at 890; Burson, 504 U.S. at 203–04.
28
Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 216 (1966).
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of propaganda in an effort to influence voters.” 29 In other words, Alabama
was attempting to regulate political speech so as to guard voters against being
unduly influenced by a deluge of campaigning and electioneering, which
could have the effect of detrimentally altering their decision-making process
when voting. 30 This statute was challenged in Mills v. Alabama, and the
United States Supreme Court considered the issue of whether such a ban on
speech during Election Day was constitutionally permissible. 31 Justice Black,
writing for the Court, determined that the law had a “fatal flaw” since
it prohibited responses to last-minute campaigning, and in so doing,
unconstitutionally suppressed political speech. 32
What appeared like a flaw to the Court may have been just a part
of the political process and inherent in campaigning itself, for someone has to
get the last word. 33 Either someone makes a statement on the day before the
election that is not subject to rebuttal on the day of the election because the
Alabama law prohibits it, or someone makes a statement on Election Day that
could avoid a response because the issue would become moot the day after. 34
The Court, not finding this distinction relevant, opted to strike down a statute
that, in its view, was guilty of having the effect of suppressing speech in
the first place. 35 Despite striking down this broad attempt at election silence,
the decision left open the question of whether a state could in some form
regulate “conduct in and around the polls in order to maintain peace, order
and decorum there.” 36
By 1992, all fifty states had taken advantage of this gray area. 37
Tennessee was one such state that regulated speech and conduct in and around
the polls. 38 Tennessee Code § 2-7-111 restricted “posters, signs or other
campaign materials” from being displayed or distributed within 100 feet of
a polling place’s entrance. 39 This statute served to protect those voters from
confusion and undue influence as they decided and entered in their votes. 40
However, as a law that restricted political speech, its constitutionality was
challenged on free speech grounds. 41 The Supreme Court in First
Amendment jurisprudence traditionally has a “hostility to . . . a prohibition of
public discussion of an entire topic,” especially in the context of political
Id. at 219 (citation omitted).
See id. at 216.
31
Id. at 215.
32
Id. at 220.
33
Raleigh Hannah Levine, The (Un)Informed Electorate: Insights into the Supreme Court's Electoral
Speech Cases, 54 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 225, 277–78 (2003).
34
See Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 220 (1966).
35
See id.; see also Levine, supra note 33, at 277–78.
36
Mills, 384 U.S. at 218.
37
See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 206 (1992) (citation omitted).
38
Id. at 193.
39
Id. (quoting TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-7-111(b) (1991)).
40
Id. at 198–99.
41
Id. at 194.
29
30
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speech. 42 However, in a departure from its decision in Mills v. Alabama, the
Court allowed that such prohibitions might survive judicial review if they met
three requirements of the strict scrutiny test. 43 First, the government’s
interest(s) must be compelling; second, the prohibitions in the statute must be
necessary; and third, the prohibitions have to be narrowly drawn to meet the
necessity of the compelling interest(s) asserted. 44
In Burson v. Freeman, the Court recognized that political speech
is vital to the functioning of our country due to its role in our continuing
experiment of self-governance. 45 That experiment—democracy—requires
the public to engage in communication with one another in an effort to shape
public opinion and create policy. 46 To facilitate this, the First Amendment
protects political speech and ultimately fosters an environment that
is conducive to the “creation of free public opinion.” 47 The Court embraces
the idea that the democratic process only works when people “believe that
they are . . . potential authors of law” by voting through free and fair
elections. 48 After all, what is voting but an expression of one’s public
opinion?
However, complications exist, as people can be misled or intimidated
into altering their speech and votes—or worse—not engaging at all in
the process. 49 Thus, the “right of its citizens to vote freely for the candidates
of their choice” and “the right to vote in an election conducted with integrity
and reliability” needed to be protected. 50 These justifications served as
the basis for the Tennessee government’s enactment of the 100-foot
provision, and they were recognized by a plurality of the Court as compelling
interests. 51 Thus, to be constitutional, the contested statute would have to pass
“exacting scrutiny” as a content-based restriction. 52 Thus, the statute needed
to be necessary to achieve the effects contemplated by the compelling
interests and “narrowly drawn to achieve that end.” 53
When bearing in mind the country’s past experiences with subpar
voting practices, the necessity of excluding political speech becomes clear. 54
The act of excluding political speech around polling places was required
to prevent a return to the unorganized and unreliable electoral processes of the
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
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Id. at 197 (citation omitted).
Id. at 198 (quoting Perry Ed. Ass’n v. Perry Loc. Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)).
Id. (quoting Perry Ed. Ass’n, 460 U.S.at 45).
Id. at 196.
Robert Post, Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REV. 477, 482 (2011).
Id. at 487 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 482.
See generally Gilda R. Daniels, Voter Deception, 43 IND. L. REV. 343 (2010).
Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198–99 (1992).
Id.
Id. at 198.
Perry Ed. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
Burson, 504 U.S. at 200–06; see supra notes 19–25 and accompanying text.
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past, by allowing voters to have a few moments of peace and security while
contemplating their final decision.55 The Court also observed that “numerous
other Western democracies” at the time also utilized the same system of using
secret ballots in areas free of political speech. 56 These considerations led the
plurality of the Court to decide that Tennessee’s law was necessary to achieve
their compelling interests.57
However, there had to be limits to the size of the zone of exclusion. 58
Such was the effect of narrowly tailoring the statute to meet the necessity. 59
Create too large of a zone, and the effects of the free speech prohibition
exceed what the compelling interest requires; create too small of a zone, and
the compelling interest ceases to be protected at all. 60 The Court did not
specify what would be too large or too small of a distance from the polling
place; instead, it commented that the 100-foot zone in the Tennessee statute
did not present a “significant impingement” to one’s First Amendment
rights. 61 There is some common sense in this conclusion, in that it does not
take long to walk 100 feet, and that time spent walking to the ballot box might
as well be “as free from interference as possible.” 62 Whether the zone was
slightly closer or further to the polling site was only a small matter of degree
and largely irrelevant to the fact that the statute was restrictive on its face.63
However, the Court acknowledged that a maximum limit could theoretically
exist, citing Mills v. Alabama as an example where a law suppressing political
speech was clearly an unconstitutional burden on citizens’ rights to free
speech.64
The effects of these two decisions continue to be felt today, as modern
elections have reached a greater intensity never before seen, with
increased campaign spending, a greater emphasis on “Get Out the Vote”
efforts, and new forays into social media advertising.65 In the final days
of an election, it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to escape the
effects of American campaigning.
Burson, 504 U.S. at 210.
Id. at 206; see infra notes 127–47 and accompanying text.
57
Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 206 (1992).
58
Id. at 208.
59
Id.
60
See id. at 206–07.
61
Id. at 210.
62
Id. However, long lines at some precincts and early voting locations may exceed the 100-foot
boundary.
See Arelis R. Hernádez, America in Line, WASH. POST (Oct. 25, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/elections/voting-lines-2020-election/; David Litt, Ohio’s
quarter-mile early-voting lines? That’s what voter suppression looks like, GUARDIAN (Oct. 15, 2020,
8:32 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/oct/15/ohio-us-election-voter-suppression.
63
Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 210 (1992).
64
Id.
65
See generally Albert, supra note 1; DONALD P. GREEN & ALAN S. GERBER, GET OUT THE VOTE:
HOW TO INCREASE VOTER TURNOUT (2nd. ed. 2008); Lata Nott, Political Advertising on Social Media
Platforms, AMERICAN BAR ASS’N (June 25, 2020), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/crsj/publications/
human_rights_magazine_home/voting-in-2020/political-advertising-on-social-media-platforms/.
55
56
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B. Modern Election Laws and Practices

Since 1992, laws have changed across many jurisdictions in multiple
areas of election law. This section first focuses on how states have adjusted
to Burson and how polling place buffer zones continue to be challenged in
light of that decision. This section also takes note of the introduction and
rapid application of digital technology, cable news networks, and social media
since that time. States have been slow to modernize their election protocols
and equipment. 66 Although the actual practice of voting may have just
recently become more refined, states are still operating under decades-old
laws. 67 Recent and future developments surrounding elections may prompt
further changes to election silence so as to protect voters and election integrity
against undue influence and fraud. Exit polls and news reporting can
influence Election Day voters, direct mail and advertising can influence
mail-in ballot voters, and internet ads and emails can, one day, influence
online voters. If elections continue to modernize and evolve, then in order to
continue protecting voters, election laws must adapt.
1. Polling Place Buffer Zone Laws
Given that the Supreme Court has yet to adopt a bright-line test or
declare a maximum distance, states have had to decide what constitutes
an appropriate restricted zone in light of the Burson decision. In 2004,
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that Kentucky’s use of a
500-foot zone was too large, that “it prohibit[ed] speech over too
much geography . . . .” 68 Eleven years later, when faced with a smaller
300-foot zone, the Sixth Circuit again ruled Kentucky’s statute
unconstitutional because the state failed to demonstrate how it was necessary
to have a 300-foot zone as opposed to the standard 100 feet as approved by
Burson. 69 Today, the state uses a 100-foot zone, enacted in July 2016. 70

66
Eric Geller et al., The scramble to secure America’s voting machines, POLITICO,
https://www.politico.com/interactives/2019/election-security-americas-voting-machines/ (May 26, 2021).
67
See id; see also Anthony J. Gaughan, Illiberal Democracy: The Toxic Mix of Fake News,
Hyperpolarization, and Partisan Election Administration, 12 DUKE J. CONST. LAW & PUB. POL'Y 57, 101,
136 (2017).
68
Anderson v. Spear, 356 F.3d 651, 666 (6th Cir. 2004).
69
Russell v. Lundergan-Grimes, 784 F.3d 1037, 1053 (6th Cir. 2015).
70
KY. REV. STAT. § 117.235.
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Figure 1: Campaign speech exclusion zones measured in feet. 71

* Georgia also restricts speech within 25 feet of persons standing in line to vote.
* Wyoming uses “100 yards” rather than the functional equivalent of 300 feet.

A majority of jurisdictions (marked in Fig. 1 as gray or light gray)
now also use the Burson-approved 100 feet or less when determining where
campaign speech can be permitted around the polling location itself. 72 It is
important to reiterate that the Burson decision did not mandate a floor or
a ceiling of how far from a polling place a state may restrict speech, but rather,
it merely approved Tennessee’s use of a 100-foot zone as a standard. 73
As such, fourteen states (marked in dark gray) go beyond this standard, opting
for zones of 150, 300, or even as high as 600 feet in Louisiana. 74
Louisiana is an obvious outlier in this collection of exclusion zones,
and this may be attributable to its French and Spanish-influenced mixed civil
and common law system resulting from its colonial history. 75 Whatever the
case may be as to the cause of their difference in zone distances, the 600-foot
71
Adapted from: National Association of Secretaries of State, State Laws Prohibiting Electioneering
Activities Within a Certain Distance of the Polling Place, https://www.nass.org/sites/default/files/surveys/
2020-10/state-laws-polling-place-electioneering-Oct-2020-.pdf (Oct. 2020).
72
Id.; see supra Figure 1.
73
Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992).
74
See supra Figure 1.
75
French Law, LA. STATE U. LAW LIBRARY, https://libguides.law.lsu.edu/c.php?g=693022
(Aug. 11, 2021, 9:36 AM).
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zone is here to stay. It was last significantly challenged in 1993 in the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which upheld the zone on the basis that 600 feet
was legally justifiable and necessary due to a valid compelling interest. 76
The Fifth Circuit considered Burson v. Freeman, which had been decided
only a year earlier, and concluded that the 600-foot radius met the conception
of “necessary” in Burson due to Louisiana’s prior attempts at smaller zones
of exclusion. 77 There existed evidence of a necessity that previous legislative
attempts had not yet met; thus, the increased distance was legitimate as a step
toward meeting that necessity. 78 Clearly, that necessity has been met, for it
has not been changed since. 79
2. Exit Polls and News Reporting
The practice of gathering and publishing exit polls on Election Day
is not a new one. 80 Exit polling does have its utility as a way of gauging
public opinion for certain candidates and issues, as well as how voters are
feeling on Election Day. 81 They also assist news networks and campaigns
with projecting vote totals so they can call a race. 82 However, exit polls have
been a source of tension due to the Burson-type polling place zone
restrictions. 83 Numerous cases have come before the Supreme Court
regarding the media’s access to voters in a fact-gathering exercise in exit
polling. 84 Through many of these decisions, the Court has held true to its
principles in “protect[ing] the ‘free flow’ of information and ideas to the
public” and granted exit polls greater leeway. 85 Today, in states like Ohio
and Texas, exit polling is permitted within the 100-foot boundaries around
polling places. 86 In fact, only six states continue to prohibit exit polls within
their respective distances by law. 87
Gathering data for exit polls is an example of how the law can be
constructed around a non-disruptive practice. Exit pollsters only ask
questions of voters after they have already voted and generally do not impede
76
Schirmer v. Edwards, 2 F.3d 117, 124 (5th Cir. 1993); Recall '92 v. Edwards, 511 U.S. 1017 (1994)
(cert. denied).
77
Schirmer, 2 F.3d at 121–22.
78
Id. at 122.
79
LA. STAT. ANN. § 18:1462 (2013).
80
Explaining Exit Polls, American Ass’n for Pub. Opinion Res., https://www.aapor.org/AAPOR
_Main/media/MainSiteFiles/Explaining-Exit-Polls_1.pdf.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
See generally McDonald, supra note 3.
84
See generally id.
85
Id. at 250–51.
86
Precinct Election Official Manual, OHIO SECRETARY OF STATE, 2-56, https://www.ohiosos.gov/
globalassets/elections/eoresources/peo-training/peotrainingmanual.pdf (June 15, 2021); Election Advisory
No. 2018-11, TEX. SEC’Y OF STATE (Feb. 16, 2018), https://www.sos.state.tx.us/elections/laws/advisory
2018-11.shtml.
87
Electioneering Prohibitions, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Apr. 1, 2021),
https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/electioneering.aspx.
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on the voting process inside the polling place. 88 However, exit polls can be
disruptive once they are reported. 89 Polling organizations often do not release
results until after the election has closed in the jurisdiction to avoid this
influential effect. 90
Though, exit polls released in earlier-closing states such as Florida
and Pennsylvania may influence voters’ decisions in later-closing states such
as Nevada or Arizona. 91 Similarly, news reporting of vote counting results in
earlier-closing states, or even projections of the winner of such states do
influence voters. 92 If voters see that the race is tilting one way or the other,
they may be less motivated to vote because they feel that their candidate
is winning by enough not to need their vote, or that their candidate is losing
by so much that their vote ultimately will not matter. 93 According to one
study, the total vote may decrease anywhere from 1% to 5% due to voters
deciding not to show up as a result of exit polls. 94 While the study noted that
most researchers might not think such a decrease is significant enough to
require legislative action, four states in the 2016 presidential election and
three states in 2020 had a margin of less than 1%. 95
3. Mail-in, Early, and Online Voting
Absentee ballots were developed to provide for individuals who
could not make their way to a physical polling place for some good cause. 96
Absentee ballot rates were very low when they were introduced in
the late 1860s, but they have picked up in recent election cycles. 97 But, as of
the 2016 general election, absentee voting rates were still modest,
with the national average just under 25%. 98 Twenty-seven states and the
District of Columbia all reported that their absentee ballot usage was less than
AMERICAN ASS’N FOR PUB. OPINION RES., supra note 80.
Id.
90
Id.
91
Seymour Sudman, Do Exit Polls Influence Voting Behavior?, 50 PUB. OPINION Q. 331, 338 (1986).
92
John E. Jackson, Election Night Reporting and Voter Turnout, 27 AM. J. POL. SCI. 615, 621–22,
627 (1983).
93
See Sudman, supra note 91, at 332–33; see also Anthony M. Barlow, Restricting Election Day Exit
Polling: Freedom of Expression vs. the Right to Vote, 58 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1003, 1005–06, 1019 (1990).
94
Sudman, supra note 91, at 338.
95
Id. In 2016, the four states were Michigan, Pennsylvania, New Hampshire, and Wisconsin.
See generally Federal Elections 2016: Election Results, FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION (Dec. 2017),
https://www.fec.gov/resources/cms-content/documents/federalelections2016.pdf. In 2020, the three states
were Arizona, Georgia, and Wisconsin. Elena Mejia & Geoffrey Skelley, How The 2020 Election Changed
The Electoral Map, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Dec. 8, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/2020swing-states/.
96
Miles Parks, Why is Voting by Mail (Suddenly) Controversial? Here’s What You Need to Know,
NPR (June 4, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2020/06/04/864899178/why-is-voting-by-mailsuddenly-controversial-heres-what-you-need-to-know.
97
Id.
98
U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMM’N, THE ELECTION ADMIN. AND VOTING SURVEY: 2016
COMPREHENSIVE REPORT 8 (2017), https://eac.gov/sites/default/files/eac_assets/1/6/2016_EAVS_
Comprehensive_Report.pdf.
88
89
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10% of all votes cast. 99 Only seven states had an absentee ballot rate of more
than half; notably, the rate was that high for three of them because they
conducted their elections solely through mail-in votes. 100
Mail-in voting periods may last as long as sixty days, such as in
North Carolina, or as short as eighteen days, such as in Washington state. 101
Early voting periods last nearly as long, with Alabama permitting it for
fifty-five days before an election. 102 Looking forward to the proposals and
analysis, it seems prudent to mention that it would be quite improbable and
improper to suggest that a period of election silence lasts for eighteen to
sixty days before an election. However, there is evidence to support some
regulation of campaign speech for a shorter period of time. 103 In the last
fifty years, anywhere from a tenth to a quarter of the electorate made up their
mind about who to vote for in the two weeks prior to the election. 104 In fact,
exit polls in the 2016 presidential election revealed that around 8% of voters
decided their vote in the last few days prior to the election. 105 Although these
exit polls sampled ballot-box voters and not mail-in voters, it is not altogether
unimaginable that a sizeable number of mail-in voters would also wait until
the last minute, especially as the proportion of mail-in ballot voting grows. 106
In 2020, with the onset of the new coronavirus, COVID-19,
governments in the United States as well as internationally went into
lockdown and quarantine, limiting access to both private and public spaces. 107

Id. at 10.
Id. at 9–10, 23–25; Analysis of absentee/mail-in voting, 2016-2018, BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Analysis_of_absentee/mail-in_voting,_2016-2018 (last visited Feb. 4, 2022).
Colorado, Washington, and Oregon were three states that had adopted an election system conducted
entirely by absentee ballots, hence their high rate of mail-in votes. Olivia B. Waxman, This Is How Early
Voting Became a Thing, TIME (Oct. 25, 2016), https://time.com/4539862/early-voting-history-first-states/.
101
When States Mail Out Absentee Ballots, Nat’l Conf. of State Legislatures (Sept. 24, 2020),
https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/vopp-table-7-when-states-mail-out-absenteeballots.aspx.
102
State Laws Governing Early Voting, Nat’l Conf. of State Legislatures (Oct. 2, 2020),
https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/early-voting-in-state-elections.aspx.
103
See Brian Brox & Joseph Giammo, Late Deciders in U.S. Presidential Elections, 30 Am. Rev. Pol.
333, 338–46 (2009). See generally Janet Box-Steffensmeier et al., The Long and Short of it: The
Unpredictability of Late Deciding Voters, 39 ELECTORAL STUDIES 181 (2015).
104
Brox & Giammo, supra note 103, at 334. If those proportions are applied to the 2016 election, then
anywhere from 14 million to 34 million voters may have made up their minds in the last two weeks before
the election. See FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N, supra note 95.
105
Election 2016: Exit Polls, CNN POLITICS, https://www.cnn.com/election/2016/results/exit-polls
(Nov. 23, 2016, 11:58 AM); 2016 National President Exit Poll, FOX NEWS, https://www.foxnews.com/
politics/elections/2016/exit-polls (last visited Feb. 4, 2022).
106
See Election 2016: Exit Polls, supra note 105; see also Nathaniel Rakich, More States Are Using
Ballot Drop Boxes. Why Are They So Controversial?, FiveThirtyEight (Oct. 5, 2020, 7:00 AM),
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/more-states-are-using-ballot-drop-boxes-why-are-they-socontroversial/ (“[Drop boxes are] making it easier for voters to submit their ballot in the normal course of
their day. And unlike election offices, drop boxes are often open 24 hours a day.”).
107
Frank Jordans & Joseph Wilson, Curfews and lockdowns multiply as virus advances rapidly, PBS
Newshour (Mar. 21, 2020, 12:49 PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/health/curfews-and-lockdownsmultiply-as-virus-advances-rapidly; Grace Hauck et al., ‘Stay Home, Stay Healthy’: These states have
ordered residents to avoid nonessentialtravel amid coronavirus, USA Today, https://www.usatoday.com/
99

100
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State governments made decisions to delay elections in the thick of the
primary season, hoping that the virus threat would have largely subsided to
make it safe to vote again. 108 However, the virus approached a “second peak”
by late June, prompting states to take a hard look at alternative options for the
general election in November. 109 Some had already begun preparing by
adopting policies to send all registered voters an application for an absentee
ballot. 110 In the days leading up to Election Day, it was reported that mail-in
ballots were used at a substantially higher rate in many states in the 2020
election as compared to 2016, directly due to the pandemic. 111 There is no
indication as to whether mail-in voting will continue to be as substantial in
subsequent elections, but some believe that voting by mail will grow even
more quickly now that the country has been acquainted with the practice on
such a wide scale. 112
Other states are beginning to look to online voting as another
alternative method of ensuring enfranchisement for the states’ vulnerable
populations who cannot go out in the dangerous conditions posed by the virus
at the time. 113 Online voting in the sphere of state-run official elections in the
United States is indeed a new phenomenon, although it has existed in other
forms. In Ohio, the Libertarian Party conducted their primary election via
an online caucus, and the Green Party introduced online voting to
complement one’s officially recorded vote using a non-partisan “issues only
ballot” at the state election. 114 These small steps, although affecting

story/news/nation/2020/03/21/coronavirus-lockdown-orders-shelter-place-stay-home-state-list/
2891193001/ (Mar. 29, 2020, 5:59 PM).
108
See Nick Corasaniti & Stephanie Saul, 16 States Have Postponed Primaries During the Pandemic.
Here’s a List, N.Y. Times (Aug. 10, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/article/2020-campaign-primarycalendar-coronavirus.html.
109
The Impact of COVID-19 on Federal Elections, A.B.A. (June 24, 2020),
https://www.americanbar.org/advocacy/governmental_legislative_work/publications/washingtonletter/ju
ne_20_wl/mail-in-voting-0620wl/; COVID-19 Health And Safety Measures For Elections, NAT’L. GOV.
ASSOC. (Oct. 16, 2020), https://www.nga.org/center/publications/election-health-safety-covid-19/.
110
Sharon Bernstein, Ohio set to send all voters absentee ballot applications before presidential
election, REUTERS (June 15, 2020, 8:25 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-ohio/ohioset-to-send-all-voters-absentee-ballot-applications-before-presidential-election-idUSKBN23N00Q; Adam
Levy & Chandelis Duster, Wisconsin approves measure to send absentee ballot applications to voters,
CNN
POLITICS,
https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/28/politics/wisconsin-absentee-voting-applications/
index.html (May 28, 2020, 11:14 AM).
111
Mail-in ballot tracker: counting election votes in US swing states, GUARDIAN (Nov. 4, 2020,
1:46 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/nov/04/mail-in-ballot-tracker-us-election-2020.
112
Russell Berman & Elaine Godfrey, America’s Elections Won’t Be the Same After 2020, ATLANTIC
(Apr. 28, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2020/04/2020-election-vote-by-mail-ranked
-choice-caucuses/610780/.
113
Eric Geller, Coronavirus boosts push for online voting despite security risks, POLITICO
(May 1, 2020, 7:30 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/05/01/coronavirus-online-voting-229690.
114
Press Release, Libertarian Party of Ohio, Libertarians Hold Online Presidential Caucus,
(Dec. 1, 2019), https://lpo.org/libertarians-hold-online-presidential-caucus/; Ohio Green Party,
2020 Ohio Green Party Preliminary Caucus Results, FACEBOOK (Feb. 29, 2020, 6:14 PM),
https://www.facebook.com/ohiogreenparty/photos/a.1481233172092825/2505374603012005/?type=3&t
heater.
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“relatively small slices of the electorate,” are sure to grow and expand into
“the future of voting.” 115
With these new developments come concerns of increased voter fraud
and intimidation associated with an insecure ballot system, although there
is still debate as to whether they are substantiated. 116 Online voting was
implemented in the small Baltic country of Estonia in the early 2000s,
and there have been serious criticisms from cybersecurity experts. 117
Although the technical details of cybersecurity are beyond the scope of this
Comment, it is important to note that exploits can occur from the user-side of
the process. 118 For example, a user’s computer can be attacked by malware
due to clicking on links on emails and websites. 119
Further complicating online voting is the presence of overwhelming
access to the voters by campaigns and other interested parties. Social media
is one such avenue of influence, as candidates, campaigns, organizations, and
other “influencers” vie for attention. 120 If voters begin to vote online in
the future, they will have quick access to social media as they begin to ponder
their choices, making undue influence and intimidation a problem. 121
Such practices in social media even affect current voting practices,
as disinformation campaigns affect turnout. 122 As Trump adviser and former
New York City mayor Rudy Giuliani famously said, “[t]ruth isn’t truth.” 123
Of course, even the veracity of that statement is disputed, but it does uncover
a disturbing problem surrounding social media: whether people trust what
is being said on any given platform as the truth and whether they even should.
115
Miles Parks, States Expand Internet Voting Experiments Amid Pandemic, Raising Security Fears,
NPR (Apr. 28, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2020/04/28/844581667/states-expand-internetvoting-experiments-amid-pandemic-raising-security-fears.
116
Geller, supra note 113; Maggie Haberman et al., Trump’s False Attacks on Voting by Mail Stir
Broad Concern, N.Y. Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/24/us/politics/trump-vote-by-mail.html
(Aug. 3, 2020).
117
See Drew Springall et al., Security Analysis of the Estonian Internet Voting System (2014),
https://doi.org/10.1145/2660267.2660315; see also Billy Perrigo, What the U.S. Can Learn About
Electronic Voting From This Tiny Eastern European Nation, TIME (Mar. 1, 2019, 11:28 AM),
https://time.com/5541876/estonia-elections-electronic-voting/.
118
Springall, supra note 117, at 8.
119
Id.
120
Elizabeth Culliford, Paid social media influencers dip toes in U.S. 2020 election, Reuters
(Feb. 10, 2020, 9:06 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-influencers/paid-social-mediainfluencers-dip-toes-in-u-s-2020-election-idUSKBN2042M2.
121
Ian Vandewalker, Digital Disinformation and Vote Suppression, Brennan Center FOR JUSTICE
(Sept. 2, 2020), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/digital-disinformation-andvote-suppression. Tangentially related is the use of “deepfakes,” computer-generated videos to simulate
another person saying things that they had never said in an attempt to convince people of the veracity of
the subject matter. There are concerns that, if deepfake videos become commonplace in election media,
voters could be wrongly influenced in a way that interferes with the results of elections. See Edward Lee,
Can the U.S. Government Prohibit Deepfake Videos Intended to Deceive Voters?, The Free Internet Project
(Feb. 15, 2019), https://thefreeinternetproject.org/blog/can-us-government-prohibit-deepfake-videosintended-deceive-voters#disqus_thread.
122
Vandewalker, supra note 121.
123
Rebecca Morin & David Cohen, Giuliani: ‘Truth isn’t truth’, POLITICO, https://www.politico.com/
story/2018/08/19/giuliani-truth-todd-trump-788161 (Aug. 19, 2018, 6:16 PM) (internal citations omitted).
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Recently, however, social media platforms have taken action to combat
“fake news,” selectively censoring information that is widely known to be
false and unsubstantiated. 124 Although there are no studies about who gets
censored and who does not, as it is still a relatively new practice, it appears
that more prominent political and public figures bear the brunt of such
actions. 125
Such regulation of the internet is bound to become a greater issue
in the future, as elections continue to modernize, and engagement grows
on social media and other websites. The following section details two
different approaches to combat the negative effects of media reporting of exit
polls and results: the increased use of mail-in ballots; and the internet’s
influence on potential online voting practices in the future.
C. Proposed Changes to Election Law and Process
Just as the Supreme Court in Burson v. Freeman then observed other
democratic countries adopting the Australian model of secret ballots
and similar reforms to election law, perhaps we may understand what
our options are by observing what those countries are doing now. 126
This section will examine two modern democracies that arguably had the
most influence on the American legal system during its colonial development:
the United Kingdom and France. These two methods represent a targeted
approach against improper influence on voters and a broader approach against
any influence on voters during Election Day.
1. United Kingdom’s Approach: Ban Media Reporting
Today, the United Kingdom restricts any reporting of information
regarding voter attitudes after voting and “any forecast as to the result of
the election which is (or might reasonably be taken to be) based
on information so given [during exit polling].” 127 The United Kingdom has
done this in order to curb the possible misleading effects and potential
influence of exit polling on the voting public during Election Day. 128
124
See Trevor Hunnicutt, Twitter bans political ads; Facebook’s Zuckerberg defends them,
Reuters (Oct. 30, 2019, 4:28 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-twitter-ads/twitter-bans-politicalads-facebooks-zuckerberg-defends-them-idUSKBN1X92IK; see also Peter Suciu, Twitter Limited the
Sharing Of New York Post Story–Is It Social Media Censorship?, Forbes (Oct. 15, 2020, 11:01 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/petersuciu/2020/10/15/twitter-limited-the-sharing-of-new-york-post-story-is-it-social-media-censorship/?sh=17676c6b18ec.
125
Kalev Leetaru, Is Twitter Really Censoring Free Speech?, FORBES (Jan. 12, 2018, 5:06 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/kalevleetaru/2018/01/12/is-twitter-really-censoring-free-speech/?sh=3984d
6df65f5; Can Twitter censor my tweets?, FOX BUSINESS (May 28, 2020), https://www.foxbusiness.com/
politics/can-twitter-censor-my-tweets.
126
Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 206 (1992).
127
Representation of the People Act 1983, c. 2 § 66A(1)(a)–(b) (UK).
128
SELECT COMMITTEE ON POLITICAL POLLING AND DIGITAL MEDIA, THE POLITICS OF POLLING,
2017–19, HL Paper 106, Chapter 5
220 (UK).
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However, the House of Lords recognized that while it is advantageous
to protect their voters during Election Day itself, it did not extend that same
logic to a wider ban of polls across multiple days leading up to the election. 129
The United Kingdom also requires its media organizations to cease
“[d]iscussion and analysis of election and referendum issues” when the polls
open in the country. 130 This election silence continues until the end of polls,
at which point they may begin analysis and reporting of exit polls. 131
However, there is also no restriction on political speech and reporting before
the polling stations themselves open; thus, these rules are not affected by any
mail-in balloting. 132 Campaigns themselves are permitted to continue
electioneering all day in an effort to get out the vote. 133
This approach exemplified by the United Kingdom has the effect
of banning “speculating on TV, radio or online about the outcome of
the election,” permitting voters to go about their day and make their choice as
they see fit. 134 In the United States, there exist no such laws prohibiting media
reporting of exit polling and results, but news organizations often restrain
themselves from doing so until the polls close in a specific jurisdiction. 135
A Congressional Report from 2001 surmises that Congress “apparently could
not ban media projections outright.” 136 Under this approach, Congress could
restrict the time period in which those projections could be reported,
ultimately allowing news organizations to make their projections after
a specified time.
Though, there is criticism within the United Kingdom that such laws
restricting media reporting do not go far enough, as other individuals on other
platforms are not subject to election silence.137 Voters are increasingly getting
information from non-traditional sources, such as from social media
commentary. 138 To address this, some have suggested that election silence
should be abolished, or instead, that laws be updated to encompass all election
speech online. 139
Id. at 248.
Office of Communications, The Office of Communications Broadcasting Code, 2019, at 35 (UK),
https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0016/132073/Broadcast-Code-Full.pdf.
131
Id.
132
Id.
133
Paige Morrow, UK election 2019: We need to change the rules on poll day reporting, Article 19
(Dec. 11, 2019), https://www.article19.org/resources/uk-we-need-to-change-the-rules-on-election-dayreporting/.
134
Bianca Britton, Why the UK has such restrictive reporting laws on election day, CNN Business,
https://www.cnn.com/2019/12/11/media/uk-election-reporting-restrictions-intl-gbr-ge19/index.html
(Dec. 12, 2019, 4:56 PM).
135
Dara Lind, How exit polls work: when they’re released, which states they cover, and what they
mean, VOX, https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2016/11/8/13563308/exit-polls-2016-time-election
-results (Nov. 9, 2016, 12:16 AM).
136
CONG. RSCH. SERV., RS20762, ELECTION PROJECTIONS: FIRST AMENDMENT ISSUES (2001).
137
Morrow, supra note 133.
138
Id.
139
Id.
129
130
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2. France’s Approach: Ban All Speech
France is one such country that takes the latter approach, restricting
all election speech across the board, across France, and its numerous
territorial holdings around the globe. 140 From when the polls open in the
French West Indies to when the polls close in metropolitan France the next
day, a blanket ban on campaigning and reporting of election results is in
effect. 141 A French government official explained the necessity of such
imposing laws, stating that “[t]his is about ensuring that the last voter to arrive
at a voting office has the same information as the first . . . .” 142
However, it is difficult to enforce this law on over sixty-seven million
French citizens. 143 As a consequence, “[t]he [French] Constitutional Council
. . . declared it ‘preferable’ that individuals abstain from electoral propaganda
during that period.” 144 “Preferable” is not a confident indicator of consistent
enforcement of election silence, and citizens often use loopholes such as code
words or foreign hashtags to evade penalties. 145
It is hard to believe that such a broad and all-encompassing law could
be feasibly enforced in the United States, much less survive constitutional
scrutiny. 146 An “all or nothing” approach is not likely to produce results, and
it may instead be better to target “a discrete subset of the population which
society relies upon to gather and disseminate valuable information.” 147
Part III analyzes why the British and French models are insufficient and
improper for American needs in light of our history and laws and offers
a middle road to sufficiently address the problem of voter protection and
election integrity in an evolving world.

140
French election reporting restricted as voting starts overseas, RFI (FR.) (June 5, 2017, 12:01 PM),
https://www.rfi.fr/en/france/20170506-french-election-reporting-restricted-voting-starts-overseas.
141
Id.; French media rules prohibit election coverage over weekend, France 24 (FR.),
https://www.france24.com/en/20170506-france-media-rules-prohibit-election-coverage-over-weekendpresidential-poll (July 5, 2017, 8:42 AM). The statement from the CSA reads: “Starting from the night
before polls open, it is illegal to publish or broadcast by all means of communication any message that may
be categorised as electoral propaganda . . . .” Id.
142
Scott Sayare, French Media Question Election Reporting Rules, N.Y. Times (Apr. 20, 2012),
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/21/world/europe/french-media-question-election-reporting-rules.html.
143
Demography – Average population of the year – France (including Mayotte since 2014), Institut
National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques (Jan. 18, 2022), https://www.insee.fr/
en/statistiques/serie/001641584.
144
French election reporting restricted as voting starts overseas, supra note 140; see Caoilfhionn
Gallagher QC & Jonathan Price, Breaking the election silence: cross-border reporting of election day
polls, INFORRM (May 18, 2017), https://inforrm.org/2017/05/18/breaking-the-election-silence-crossborder-reporting-of-election-day-polls-caoilfhionn-gallagher-qc-and-jonathan-price/.
145
French election reporting restricted as voting starts overseas, supra note 140; Sayare, supra
note 142.
146
McDonald, supra note 3, at 354–55.
147
Id. at 354.
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ANALYSIS

In our modernizing world, it is clear that the direction for elections is
heading toward universal mail-in and/or online voting, which pose some
challenging problems in terms of voter protections and election security. 148
Just as the onset of vicious solicitation efforts in the early 19th century
prompted the adoption of the Australian secret ballot system, and just
as continued voter intimidation in the 20th century prompted the
establishment of restricted zones around polling places, so too should the
recent developments that threaten election integrity prompt action now. 149
Following the same evolutionary thread of election reform as set out by
the Court in Burson, it becomes clear that our modern age holds new risks
that must be addressed with progressive reforms. 150
Part II addressed two potential approaches ranging from a more
modest restriction of media reporting of results to an expansive prohibition
on all speech relating to the election on Election Day. This part will explain
why such approaches are inappropriate for the United States, and it will chart
a middle-road proposal that adequately addresses the issue of voter protection
and election security while also respecting the First Amendment protection
of free speech. Rather than milquetoast regulations or extreme bans, a more
reasonable approach consists of limiting not only media reporting but also
commentary from public figures and influential persons. This would be
a targeted effort to ensure that voters are not unduly influenced or intimidated
on Election Day. Then it will show how the favored approach solves
problems in both the traditional in-person voting context as well as in
the evolving mail-in and online arenas.
A. Too Small and Too Big: Flawed Propositions
Restricting media reporting is a good first step in addressing
the problem of undue influence on voters during Election Day. As noted in
Part II, the United Kingdom’s approach serves to protect voters by ensuring
that speculation is limited and that voters can go to the polls confident that
their votes matter. 151 Indeed, prohibiting media organizations from
publishing exit polling or election results until the last polls have closed
nationally would mean that results from the east would not influence voters
in the western part of the country. Further, the absence of media commentary
would allow voters to ponder their choices without being swayed by the news
organizations on which Americans have come to depend. 152
See infra notes 191–94 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 19–57 and accompanying text.
150
Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 200–06 (1992).
151
See supra notes 127–39 and accompanying text.
152
See generally Gregory J. Martin & Ali Yurukoglu, Bias in Cable News: Persuasion and
Polarization, 107 AM. ECON. REV. 2565 (2017).
148
149
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However, such a proposal falls short of addressing the many
other sources of influence on voters that are not the news media. Voters are
still susceptible to alternate sources of “news” and “facts” via social media
and other websites. This limited approach also fails to affect voter
influence and intimidation around the polling place. While voters may
currently be protected within some arbitrary distance from the ballot box,
there is still a significant amount of electioneering occurring elsewhere.
The Supreme Court noted in Burson that a person should have the freedom to
ponder on their choices while approaching the ballot. 153 The problem is that,
when recognizing that a tenth to a quarter of voters choose their candidate
within two weeks of the election, and 8% did so in the last few days of the
2016 presidential election, there may still yet be a significant population of
voters deciding on the day of the election. 154
These eleventh-hour voters wake up in the morning and have their
morning coffee while reading the newspaper and watching cable television.
On the way to the polls, voters are bombarded with bright billboards,
loud radio ads, and overzealous volunteers with clipboards. All the while,
their phones might be buzzing with emails or texts from campaigns
imploring them to vote for a candidate. In our modern technological age,
we are deluged with an astounding amount of information. One hundred feet,
six hundred feet, or even one-thousand feet are not going to be enough to
protect these voters from any of that. It is a relatively insignificant
consolation that we can have at least 15 to 30 seconds of relative peace while
we approach the ballots, depending on how fast one walks. 155
Certainly, a heavy-handed approach would theoretically solve all
of these problems at once. If the United States adopted the French model
of prohibiting all election and campaign speech for the duration of Election
Day, there would be very few, if any, sources of intimidation and influence
on voters as they went to the polls. Nobody would be permitted to solicit
votes, billboards and placards would be removed from view, and the airwaves
would return to more commonplace advertising, just as if it were the day after
Election Day. Even in the mail-in and online contexts, a complete ban could
mean reduced direct campaign mail, emails, and advertising on websites.
Without any measurable source of influence of any kind, it becomes difficult
to see how election integrity could be compromised through voter
intimidation.

Burson, 504 U.S. at 210.
See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
155
An average human walks at a speed of about 2.8 miles per hour (“mph”) (1.25 meters per second),
but some walk slower at 2.3 mph (1.03 m/s), and others walk faster at 4.6 mph (2.07 m/s).
Michaela Schimpl et al., Association Between Walking Speed and Age in Healthy, Free-Living Individuals
Using Mobile Accelerometry—a Cross-Sectional Study, 6 PLOS ONE 1, 6 (Aug. 2011). This number
assumes that no line forms at the polling place.
153
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However, such an approach is fundamentally hostile to the
First Amendment. 156 Political speech is one of the most highly regarded
“The First Amendment
forms of speech in the United States. 157
‘was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing
about of political and social changes desired by the people.’” 158 To infringe
upon people’s right to speak about political issues in a democratic process
would without question be contrary to the purpose of the First Amendment
right to free speech. Even though the government may regulate speech
in certain circumstances as compelling interests demand it, given current
Supreme Court precedent, such expansive prohibitions seem impossibly
unlikely. 159 It is hard to justify such sweeping restrictions as necessary to
the compelling interests of protecting the electorate.
Further, as the French have experienced, enforcing this sort of law
and prosecuting violations is not feasible. 160 Compliance is effectively
voluntary—it can be best described as an honor system. 161 Given the
United States’ fierce freedom of speech traditions, it is doubtful that
Americans would stand for such a law that feels like Orwellian censorship.
So, what then is an appropriate level of regulation?
B. Just Right: A Balanced Approach
This middle-road proposal charts a path that does more than just
restrict media reporting and is more refined than a blanket ban on political
speech. It recognizes that the 100-foot zone accepted by Burson is no longer
sufficient to protect voters on Election Day due to the new forms of voter
outreach, influence, and even intimidation. This proposal goes back to the
statute in Mills v. Alabama and restricts “electioneering” on Election Day,
which gives the American electorate some leeway on political speech. This
section will also demonstrate that these actions are necessary and measured
approaches to address the compelling interests of voter intimidation and
excessive influence. 162
Electioneering is defined as taking “an active part in an election” and
“the activity of trying to persuade people to vote for a particular political
party.” 163 The statute in Mills v. Alabama proscribed “electioneering or []
See generally McDonald, supra note 3.
See generally id.; David Tan, Political Recoding of the Contemporary Celebrity and the First
Amendment, 2 Harv. J. Sports & Ent. Law 1, 8–17 (2011).
158
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983) (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,
484 (1957)).
159
See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 210 (1992); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966).
160
See supra notes 143–45 and accompanying text.
161
See supra notes 143–45 and accompanying text.
162
This proposal uses the same interests that the Supreme Court in Burson deemed to be compelling:
the right to vote and the right to an election conducted with integrity. Burson, 504 U.S. at 198–99.
163
Electioneer, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1993);
Electioneering, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/
156
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solicit[ing] any votes,” indicating that the activity most likely to cause voter
influence and intimidation is the direct and active communication to other
individuals in a persuasive manner. 164 The action at issue in Mills was
the publication of a newspaper editorial intended to persuade people to vote
a certain way. 165
Another component of identifying what constitutes electioneering is
also the medium of communication or distribution. The Federal Election
Commission (“FEC”) has defined “electioneering communication” as
“any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication” that “refers to a clearly
identified candidate for Federal office . . . .” 166 It also stipulates that such
a communication reaches 50,000 or more people in the relevant jurisdiction of
the candidates, which makes the distinction between popular communications
and communications that have a lower impact. 167 However, their definition
has exceptions that exempt news stories and commentary, among other
things. 168 A more robust and less limiting definition of electioneering
communications will be necessary to ensure uniform rules for the entire
American public, and not just campaigns and special interest groups.
This proposal carries over the same definition of electioneering when
it comes to the persuasive capacity of any given person’s message, and
it applies the FEC’s requirements that an election communication is publicly
distributed in some manner. Such communications can take place in a variety
of ways: via verbal conversation, text or email messaging, television ads,
billboards, and so on. To be clear, this proposal does not include the FEC’s
other stipulations, such as identifying a candidate, taking place on the
airwaves, reaching 50,000 people, or exceptions for the media. That way, this
proposal can go further than the United Kingdom’s media-only approach, but
not quite as far as the French model of total election silence.
Individuals will still be able to discuss things of political nature with
one another in private settings, even if they are persuasive. For example,
families eating breakfast at the table can make last-ditch efforts to convince
one another to vote a certain way without fear of violating election silence.
Friends and colleagues can send each other messages and emails, and those
kinds of speech are not publicly distributed. Allowing this kind of speech
is consistent with the principle that Americans should have an “interchange
of ideas” in a participatory democracy.169 Discussing politics and issues with
electioneering (last visited Feb. 4, 2022). No entries for “electioneer” or its derivative forms appear in
Black’s Law Dictionary.
164
Mills, 384 U.S. at 216.
165
Id. at 215.
166
52 U.S.C. § 30104(f)(3)(A).
167
Id. § 30104(f)(3)(C).
168
Id. § 30104(f)(3)(B).
169
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983) (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,
484 (1957)).
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one another is the very foundation of the American experiment and is not
something to be abridged. 170
In the public setting, however, things get more complicated.
For example, people could talk about protecting their Second Amendment
rights, permitting access to abortions, advocating for higher taxes on the
wealthy, and so on. These are clearly partisan issues from which one can
discern the speaker’s political position and persuasive intent. 171 While not
referring to a specific candidate or ballot issue, individuals can refer to
right-leaning or left-leaning candidates on the ballot by their well-known
policy positions. The Supreme Court in Burson approved the 100-foot zone
because it would allow voters to be free from interference.172 In the spirit of
shielding voters from overzealous advocates on Election Day, such reference
to issues in a persuasive manner must also be restricted. Simply having
a conversation about climate change, conflicts in the Middle East, or
agricultural policy should be permitted, provided that there is no intent to
pressure someone to vote in favor or against the issue being discussed.
Making these distinctions between public and private communication
and persuasive and non-persuasive speech is what makes this a middle-road
approach. 173 The following sections discuss how the problems associated
with voter influence and intimidation are ameliorated or solved by
implementing this proposal.
C. Necessary and Narrowly Drawn to Protect In-Person Voters
The Supreme Court struck down the election silence law in
Mills v. Alabama with a condemnation of any effort to silence political
speech. 174 The Court made no reference to compelling interests or other
reasons why such a law might be necessary; instead, it held that “no test of
reasonableness” could save such a law. 175 Over two and a half decades later,
the Court would then apply such a test in Burson v. Freeman to restrictions of
political speech, stating that such laws could survive strict scrutiny. 176 To do

Post, supra note 46, at 483.
See Frank Newport & Andrew Dugan, Opinion, Partisan Differences Growing on a Number of
Issues, Gallup (Aug. 3, 2017), https://news.gallup.com/opinion/polling-matters/215210/partisandifferences-growing-number-issues.aspx.
172
Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 206 (1992).
173
It should be mentioned that such distinctions may be difficult to draw, and this Comment will not
endeavor to create a bright-line rule beyond the generalized approach that has already been suggested. The
Supreme Court is wrestling with these distinctions, and it will be up to the judiciary to determine what
private and public means in this context, as well as persuasive and non-persuasive. See generally
Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921 (2019).
174
Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 220 (1966).
175
Id.
176
Burson, 504 U.S. at 199–200.
170
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so, the prohibitions required by statute would have to be necessary and
narrowly drawn to achieve the compelling interests asserted.177
The state of Tennessee in Burson alleged that it had two compelling
interests, both of which are still applicable today: the “right to vote freely”
and the right to an “election conducted with integrity and reliability.” 178
Nothing has changed in the last several decades from the legal standpoint to
jeopardize the status of the most fundamental right conferred upon citizens of
the United States. 179 When revisiting Mills v. Alabama in the modern context,
applying the rationale of Burson v. Freeman, it becomes clear that such
prohibitions expressed in this Comment’s proposal are indeed necessary.
Further, it is also clear that they are drawn narrowly enough to achieve
the desired effect.
The form of speech is one area in which the proposal needs to be
narrowly drawn, which was one of the concerns that the Court had in
Burson. 180 In limiting the election silence to only publicly disseminated
persuasive speech, the proposal’s regulation is not overinclusive in that it
captures other forms of political speech that do not affect voter integrity.
Further, it is not underinclusive, as it without question regulates a wide range
of speech-related to voter influence. The Burson Court determined that
the 100-foot zone was not underinclusive because “the failure to regulate all
speech . . . [does not render] the statute fatally underinclusive.” 181 Likewise,
the clear omission of regulation from private and/or non-persuasive political
speech does not mean that the proposal is flawed in that regard. Instead,
the fact that such speech is excluded from regulation should do the proposal
some credit in recognizing that some forms of speech are less likely to affect
voters negatively.
Next, the length of time in which political speech is restricted is also
necessary and narrowly drawn. The goal is to shield voters from influence
and intimidation on Election Day as they go to the polls, and the proposal
would only be active while the polls are open. From the moment that the first
polls open to the moment that the last polls close in the jurisdiction(s) which
the elected office represents, no public persuasive speech will be permitted.
The proposal does not act to limit speech indefinitely; rather, it is restricted
to only the times in which the polls are open—people are free to speak
beforehand, and they are free to speak again afterward. These are necessary
sacrifices to ensure that this country’s election processes and systems
continue to be trusted. Voters must have the opportunity to ponder their
177

Id.
Id. at 198–99.
179
See generally Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018) (voicing the Court’s affirmation for the right
to vote as one of the most fundamental rights despite never reaching the core of the issue).
180
Burson, 504 U.S. at 206–07, 210–11.
181
Id. at 207.
178
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choices during the day and be free from influence and intimidation from
others.
In fact, the Supreme Court of the United States has spoken on the
subject of ensuring that decisions made by individuals are informed ones. 182
In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Court permitted a law that helped
“ensure that a woman’s decision to abort is a well-considered one . . . .” 183
It may seem disingenuous to compare abortion to voting, but the point is valid
that the Supreme Court is concerned about important decisions being made
by individuals. Abortion is a decision that can affect the potential life of
a baby, and voting has been described as “a right at the heart of our
democracy.” 184 It should not be so untoward to suggest that individuals
should have a just as well-considered decision when they go to vote at
the polls.
Lastly, it must be noted in this section that early voting is a form of
in-person voting in which individuals can also be susceptible to influence and
intimidation. 185 Early voting is similar to traditional election-day voting in
that regard, but it is also different because it takes place over a broad span
of time, sometimes as long as fifty-five days in some places. 186 Of course,
extending the terms of this proposal over two months would be entirely
impractical in enforcement, severely unconstitutional, and antithetical to the
entire campaign process. 187 However, it may be that some of the aspects
of the proposal can be extended in light of recent changes favoring the use of
mail-in and early voting. For example, polling place buffer zones can be
greatly increased to cover the long lines that often occur at early voting sites
in order to achieve the effect of generalized election silence in a specific
locale. 188 Additionally, states can follow the state of Georgia’s model
in extending buffer zones to individuals in line even if they are outside of
the polling place buffer zone itself. 189 Though, this Comment does not claim
such measures as part of the proposal within, for they require more study in
their own right.
D. Applying the Constitutional Test to Mail-In and Online Voters
Similarly, mail-in voting also takes a long time, and again, it is
imprudent to expect that the proposal could apply to nearly two months’ worth
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 969 (1992).
Id. (emphasis added).
184
Burson, 504 U.S. at 198.
185
See supra notes 104–05 and accompanying text.
186
Early Voting In-Person Voting, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (June 11, 2021),
https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/early-voting-in-state-elections.aspx.
187
See McDonald, supra note 3, at 354; Gallagher & Price, supra note 144.
188
See Hernádez, supra note 62. Although the 2020 pandemic has made standing six feet apart
necessary, drastically extending the length of lines, they remain much longer than the buffer zones in
normal circumstances. Litt, supra note 62.
189
See supra Figure 1.
182
183
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of time before an election. 190 However, the restriction on electioneering
communications could cover a span of a few days prior to Election Day
to grant voters and their mailboxes some reprieve from the deluge of
campaign mail. 191 Such extended measures could be necessary to ensure
voters are getting the same fair treatment as those on Election Day. On the
contrary, it is also possible that voters are more than capable of resisting
undue influence over a longer span of time. Further study will also be
necessary to come up with a clearer picture of how voter attitudes change in
these situations and what measures would be narrowly tailored to address the
negative consequences of mail-in voting if any. Additional scholarship
should guide the solution to this temporal problem.
However, it is possible that Election Day mail-in voters will also see
benefits from the proposal’s restrictions on campaign-related speech.
Although the concept of mail-in voting suggests that voters send their ballots
to the Board of Elections via the United States Postal Service (“USPS”), there
do exist drop boxes to which voters can submit their ballots. 192 This means
that there is a possibility of voters deciding on Election Day just as any other
in-person voter would, and they are simply using the mail-in/drop box option
for the convenience of not having to wait in line during prescribed hours at
a polling place. 193 Restricting election-day speech would confer benefits to
these voters, as they can spend the day free from persuasive attempts
to influence their votes and submit their mail-in ballot at their convenience.
If online voting becomes a reality in the United States, there will be
serious consideration given to the role of cybersecurity and the influential
power of social media and other forms of access to a voter’s attention. 194
Implementing the proposal’s restriction of Election Day speech may mean
that there are fewer campaign messages in email inboxes or fewer
advertisements on webpages, both of which could be used to grab someone’s
attention. The notable absence of such things on the internet means that voters
can be confident that any links or messages are coming from government
sources regarding the election. While such a system is still quite a way from
becoming a reality, if the measures advocated by this proposal are
implemented, voters could become accustomed to the new normal on
McDonald, supra note 3, at 354.
Jacob Bogage, USPS on-time performance dips again as millions prepare to mail 2020 ballots,
Wash. Post (Oct. 9, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/10/09/usps-ballotsperformance/. As of October 9, 2020, with a month to go before the election, the USPS “had already
delivered a record 417 million pieces of election mail—including ballot applications, voter information
and 64 million ballots. That compares with 200 million during the entire 2016 election cycle.” Id. For
context, there were over 156 million registered voters in 2016. Erin Duffin, Number of registered voters
in the United States from 1996 to 2020, STATISTICA (June 28, 2021), https://www.statista.com/statistics/
273743/number-of-registered-voters-in-the-united-states/.
192
Rakich, supra note 106.
193
See id.
194
See generally supra notes 117–19 and accompanying text.
190
191

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol47/iss1/7

2022]

Election Silence

161

Election Day and ease into the process more smoothly without fear of being
led astray by overbearing or malicious actors.
The necessity of ensuring a stable election process in this way is clear,
perhaps even clearer than is the case with traditional in-person voting due to
the unprecedented level of access to the voter via the internet. Additionally,
restrictions on public and persuasive election speech are narrowly tailored in
this respect because the proximity of the voter and the ballot is closer than
ever. While voters may have “15 seconds” of reprieve from the campaigns in
the polling place under the current Burson-type laws, future online voters will
have no such thing. Without election silence protections, voters could be
reading misleading news articles, watching videos on partisan cable channels,
and listening to political podcasts from their favorite influential figures mere
moments before clicking the link to cast their ballot—all from their phone.
Even if none of the measures in this Comment become reality in our current
voting regimes, it will be absolutely imperative to extend some sort of
Burson-type election silence to the internet if Americans one day have
the option to vote online.
IV.

CONCLUSION

It is worth mentioning that this proposal is not meant to be easily and
immediately applied, but rather, different aspects of it can be implemented
and built upon one another to reach the goal of Election Day silence. 195
The more comfortable the American public becomes with the ideas at play
here, the more likely the broadest protections can be realized. 196
News organizations and social media outlets will face tough decisions on how
to address their policies and the effects they have on the American electorate.
As the internet and digital technology continue to have an outsize influence
on voters, social media outlets like Twitter and Facebook are being
scrutinized for their policies. 197 The federal government will have to take
action to standardize election law to ensure that all voters in national elections
face the same choices with the same information, free from improper
influences.
The actions taken now will impact future outcomes. Addressing
these problems soon will improve not only voter protections and election
security but also the confidence that Americans will have in their democratic
process. In a time where such confidence is being shaken, it is all the more
important that the government take necessary actions to restore public trust. 198
195
See generally MICHAEL T. HAYES, THE LIMITS OF POLICY CHANGE: INCREMENTALISM,
WORLDVIEW, AND THE RULE OF LAW 7–21, 173–180 (2001); Christopher J. Casillas et al., How Public
Opinion Constrains the U.S. Supreme Court, 55 AM. J. POL. SCI. 74, 81–86 (2011).
196
See generally HAYES, supra note 195.
197
See supra notes 124–25 and accompanying text.
198
See generally John Wagner et al., Pence declares Biden winner of the presidential election after
Congress finally counts electoral votes, WASH. POST (Jan. 7, 2021, 5:03 AM),
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The more secure the United States is in its election process, the more prepared
it will be to take on evolving election procedures such as universal mail-in
and online voting.
Further, implementing these policies might have the added effect of
calming the electorate before a winner is announced. As the 2020 general
election drew to a close, there was a feeling of tension—as if a pall cast over
the country as we waited with bated breath to find out who would be the next
President and which party would be in control of Congress. The contentious
battles leading up to Election Day certainly set the stage for our collective
apprehension as to what would happen next. 199 Without the constant barrage
of messaging and overtures from the campaigns and the frenzy of reporting
and commentary from the media, the country could breathe deeply and
exercise patience. Perhaps a brief pause will help the country collect itself
and prepare to move forward.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/01/06/congress-electoral-college-vote-live-updates/;
William Cummings et al., By the numbers: President Donald Trump’s failed efforts to overturn the
election, USA TODAY NEWS, https://www.usatoday.com/in-depth/news/politics/elections/2021/01/06/
trumps-failed-efforts-overturn-election-numbers/4130307001/ (Jan. 6, 2021, 10:50 AM).
199
The word “apprehension” seems like an appropriate representation of what many people felt on
Election Day, and even afterward. Nobody knew if the results of the presidential election would spark
civil unrest, and especially nobody knew how the Trump campaign and administration was going to
respond to President-elect Biden’s victory. Thankfully, the transition proceeded relatively smoothly into
2021, despite the events of January 6th. See Calvin Woodward, Biden inaugural: Abrupt pivot to civility
in post-Trump era, AP (Jan. 20, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/joe-biden-inauguration-day-dcee79e2f1bf1a1b2e20180b3cc63e174a; see also Lisa Mascaro et al., Pro-Trump mob storms US Capitol in
bid to overturn election, AP (Jan. 6, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/congress-confirm-joe-biden78104aea082995bbd7412a6e6cd13818. Still, it is worth our time to understand how to avoid inching so
close to the precipice next time.
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